Let PL(T, T ′ ) and PL Σ 1 (T, T ′ ) respectively indicates the provability logic and Σ1-provability logic of T relative in T ′ . In this paper we characterize the following relative provability logics:
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The provability interpretation for the modal operator ✷, first considered by Kurt Gödel [Göd33] , intending to provide a semantic for Heyting's formalization of the intuitionistic logic, IPC. On the other hand, and again by innovative and celebrated Gödel's incompleteness results [Göd31] , for a recursively enumerable theory T and a sentence in the language of T, one may formalize "A is provable in T" via a simple (Σ 1 ) formula ProvT ( A ) in the first-order language of arithmetic, in which A is the Gödel number of A. Let PL(T, T ′ ) and PL Σ 1 (T, T ′ ) respectively indicates the provability logic and Σ 1 -provability logic of T relative in T ′ (Definition 3.2). Here is a list of results on provability logics with arithmetical flavour:
1. ¬✷⊥ ∈ PL(PA, PA), [Göd31] 2. ✷(✷A → A) → ✷A ∈ PL(PA, PA), [L55] 3. A ∈ PL(HA, HA) for a nonmodal proposition A, iff A is valid in the intuitionistic logic IPC. [dJ70, dJVV11] 4. GL = PL(PA, PA) and GLS = PL(PA, N) = PL(PA, ZF), [Sol76] , in which GL is the Gödel-Löb logic, as defined in Definition 3.4. 5. ✷(A ∨ B) → (✷A ∨ ✷B) ∈ PL(HA, HA), [Myh73, Fri75] 6. ✷(A ∨ B) → ✷( ✷ . A ∨ ✷ . B) ∈ PL(HA, HA), in which ✷ . A is a shorthand for A ∧ ✷A, [Lei75] 7. iGLCT = PL(PA * , PA * ), [Vis81, Vis82] , in which iGLCT is as defined in Definition 3.4, 8 . ✷¬¬ ✷A → ✷✷A ∈ PL(HA, HA) and ✷(¬¬ ✷A → ✷A) → ✷(✷A ∨ ¬ ✷A) ∈ PL(HA, HA), [Vis81, Vis82] 9. Rosalie Iemhoff 2001 introduced a uniform axiomatization of all known axiom schemas of PL(HA, HA) in an extended language with a bimodal operator ✄. In her Ph.D. dissertation [Iem01] , Iemhoff raised a conjecture that implies directly that her axiom system, iPH, restricted to the normal modal language, is equal to PL(HA, HA), [Iem01] 10. PL {⊤,⊥} (HA, HA) is decidable. [Vis02] . In other words, he introduced a decision algorithm for A ∈ PL(HA, HA), for all A not containing any atomic variable.
11. PL Σ 1 (HA, HA) = iH σ (Definition 3.28) is decidable, [AM18, VZ19] 12. PL Σ 1 (HA * , HA * ) = iH * σ (Definition 3.28) is decidable, [AM19] As it is known in the literature [TvD88] , the Heyting Arithmetic HA, enjoys disjunction property: if HA ⊢ A ∨ B, then either HA ⊢ A or HA ⊢ B. Regrettably, HA is not able to prove this [Fri75, Myh73] . Hence, such properties, are not reflected in the provability logic of HA, as a valid principle ✷(A ∨ B) → (✷A ∨ ✷B). A natural question arises here: is there any other valid rule? One way to systematically answer this question, is to characterise the truth provability logic of HA. In the case of classical arithmetic PA, Robert Solovay in his original innovative paper [Sol76] , characterized the truth provability logic of PA. He showed that the only extra valid axiom is the soundness principle ✷A → A, which is known to be true and unprovable in PA. In this paper we show that, in the Σ 1 -provablity logic of HA, the same thing happens: The truth Σ 1 -provability logic of HA, is a decidable and only has the extra axiom schema ✷A → A. The disjunction property, which we mentioned before, will be deuced from Leivant's principle ✷(A ∨ B) → ✷(✷A ∨ ✷B) and the soundness principle.
The author of this paper in his joint paper with Mohammad Ardeshir [AM15] , showed that the arithmetical completeness of the modal logic GL, is reducible to the arithmetical completeness of GL + p → ✷p for Σ 1 interpretations. The reduction involves only propositional argument. In this paper, we show that all relative provability logics, discussed in this paper, are reducible to the truth Σ 1 -provability logic of HA (see Diagram 7) . So, in a sense, PL Σ 1 (HA, N) is the hardest among them. Definition 3.1. Suppose T is a ∆ 0 (exp)-axiomatized theory and σ is a substitution i.e. a function from atomic variables to arithmetical sentences. We define the interpretation σ T which extend the substitution σ to all modal propositions A, inductively:
• σ T (A) := σ(A) for atomic A,
• σ T distributes over ∧, ∨, →,
• σ T (✷A) := ProvT ( σ T (A) ).
We call σ a Γ-substitution (in some theory T), if for every atomic A, σ(A) ∈ Γ (T ⊢ σ(A) ↔ A ′ for some A ′ ∈ Γ). We also say that σ T is a Γ-interpretation if σ is a Γ-substitution.
Definition 3.2. The relative provability logic of T in some sufficiently strong theory U restricted to a set of first-order sentences Γ, is defined to be a modal propositional theory PL Γ (T, U) such that PL Γ (T, U) ⊢ A iff for all arithmetical substitutions σ in Γ, we have U ⊢ σ T (A) . We make this convention: PL Γ (T, N) indicates PL Γ (T, Theory(N)), in which Theory(N) is the set of all true sentences in the standard model of arithmetic.
Define NOI (No Outside Implication) as the set of modal propositions A, such that any occurrence of → is in the scope of some ✷. To be able to state an extension of Leivant's Principle (that is adequate to axiomatize Σ 1 -provability logic of HA) we need a translation on the modal language which we call Leivant's translation. We define it recursively as follows:
• A l := A for atomic or boxed A,
• (A → B) l is defined by cases: If A ∈ NOI, we define (A → B) l := A → B l , otherwise we define (A → B) l := A → B.
Let us define the box translation (.) ✷ and some variants of it:
• A ✷↑ := A ✷ := ✷ . A and A ✷↓ := A for atomic A or A := ⊤, ⊥,
• (✷A) ✷↑ := ✷A and (✷A) ✷ := (✷A) ✷↓ := ✷A ✷ ,
• (.) ✷↑ , (.) ✷ and (.) ✷↓ commute with ∧ and ∨,
Proof. Both statements are proved easily by induction on the complexity of A, and we leave them to the reader. ✷ Definition 3.4. Let us first we list some axiom schemas:
• 4 := ✷A → ✷✷A,
• The Completeness Principle: CP := C := A → ✷A.
• Restriction of Completeness Principle to atomic variables: CP a := C a := p → ✷p, for atomic p.
• The reflection principle: S := ✷A → A.
• The complete reflection principle: S * := ✷A → A ✷ .
• The Principle of Excluded Middle: PEM := P := A ∨ ¬A.
• Extended Leivant's Principle:
• Trace Principle:
• For an axiom schema A, the axiom schema A indicates the box of every axiom instance of A.
All modal systems which will be defined here, only has one inference rule: modus ponens B B → A A . Also the celebrated modal logics, like K4, which has the necessitation rule of inference, A ✷A , by abuse of notation, are considered here with the same name and with the same set of theorems, however without the necessitation rule. The reason for this alternate definition of systems, is quite technical. Of course one may define them with the necessitation rule, but at the cost of loosing the uniformity of definitions. So in the rest of this paper, all modal systems, are considered with the modus ponens rule of inference.
Consider a list A 1 , . . . , A n of axiom schemas. The notation A 1 A 2 . . . A n will be used in this paper for a modal system containing all axiom instance of all axiom schemas A i , and is closed under modus ponens. This genral notation makes things uniform and easy to remember for later usage. However, we make the following exceptions:
• GL := iGLP,
• GLS := GL plus S. We may define similarly GLSC a and GLC a .
We also gathered the list of axioms and theories in Tables 5 and 6 .
Proof. Use induction on the complexity of A. ✷ Lemma 3.6. For every modal proposition A, we have iK4
Proof. Note that the first assertion implies the second one. 
Preliminaries from Arithmetic
The first-order language of arithmetic contains three functions (successor, addition and multiplication), one predicate symbol and a constant: (S, +, · , ≤, 0). First-order intuitionistic arithmetic (HA) is the theory over IQC with the axioms:
Ind: For each formula A(x):
In which UC(B) is the universal closure of B.
Peano Arithmetic PA , has the same axioms of HAover CQC. Notation 3.9. From now on, when we are working in the first-order language of arithmetic, for a first-order sentence A, the notations ✷A and ✷ + A are shorthand for ProvHA ( A ) and ProvPA ( A ), respectively. Let iΣ 1 be the theory HA, where the induction principle is restricted to Σ 1 -formulae. We also define HA x to be the theory with axioms of HA, in which the induction principle is restricted to formulae satisfying at least one of the following conditions:
• Σ 1 -formulas,
• formulae with Gödel number less than x.
We define PA x similarly. Also define ✷ x A and ✷ + x A to be provability predicates in HA x and PA x , respectively.
The case of PA is well known [HP93] . For the case HA, see [Smo73] 
Proof. For the first item, consider some A such that HA ⊢ A. By induction on the proof of A in HA, one may prove that HA ⊢ A HA . Moreover this argument is formalizable and provable in HA. We refer the reader to [Vis82] for details. For the proof of second and third items, one may use induction on the complexity of A, and we leave the routine induction to the reader. ✷ Proof. We use induction on the complexity of A. All cases are easy, except for boxed case, which holds by Lemma 3.18. ✷
Kripke models of HA
A first-order Kripke model for the language of arithmetic is a triple K = (K, , M) such that:
• The frame of K, i.e. (K, ≺), is a non-empty partially ordered set,
• M is a function from K to the first-order classical structures for the language of the arithmetic, i.e. M(α) is a first-order classical structure, for each α ∈ K,
• For any α β ∈ K, M(α) is a weak substructure of M(β).
For any α ∈ K and first-order formula A ∈ L α (the language of arithmetic augmented with constant symbolsā for each a ∈ |M(α)|), we define K, α A (or simply α A, if no confusion is likely) inductively as follows:
It is well-known in the literature [TvD88] that HA is complete for first-order Kripke models. Lemma 3.21. Let K = (K, , M) be a Kripke model of HA and A be an arbitrary Σ 1 -formula. Then for each α ∈ K, we have α A iff M(α) |= A.
Proof. Use induction on the complexity of A to show that for each α ∈ K, we have α A iff M(α) |= A. In the inductive step for → and ∀, use Lemma 3.12. ✷
Interpretability
Let T and S be two first-order theories. Informally speaking, we say that T interprets S (T ✄ S) if there exists a translation from the language of S to the language of T such that T proves the translation of all of the theorems of S. For a formal definition see [Vis98] . It is well-known that for recursive theories T and S containing PA, the assertion T ✄ S is formalizable in first-order language of arithmetic. For two arithmetical sentences A and B, we use the notation A ✄ B to mean that PA + A interprets PA + B. The following theorem due to Orey, first appeared in [Fef60] .
Theorem 3.22. For recursive theories T and S containing PA, we have:
in which S x is the restriction of the theory S to axioms with Gödel number ≤ x and Con(U ) := ¬ ✷ U ⊥.
Proof. See [Fef60] . p.80 or [Ber90] . ✷
Convention. From Theorem 3.22, one can easily observe that
, even when we are working in weaker theories like HA, for which the above theorem (Theorem 3.22) doesn't hold. We remind the reader that ✷ + stands for provability in PA.
Somrýnski's method for Constructing Kripke models of HA
With the general method of constructing Kripke models for HA, invented by Smoryński [Smo73] , interpretability of theories containing PA plays an important role in constructing Kripke models of HA. Definition 3.23. A triple I := (K, , T ) is called an I-frame iff it has the following properties:
• (K, ) is a finite tree,
• T is a function from K to arithmetical r.e. consistent theories containing PA,
Theorem 3.24. For every I-frame I := (K, , T ) there exists a first-order Kripke model K = (K, , M) such that K HA and moreover M(α) |= T α , for any α ∈ K. Note that both of the I-frame and Kripke model are sharing the same frame (K, ).
Proof. See [Smo73, . For more detailed proof of a generalization of this theorem, see [AM14, Theorem 4.8] . ✷
The NNIL formulae and related topics
The class of No Nested Implications to the Left, NNIL formulae in a propositional language was introduced in [VvBdJRdL95] , and more explored in [Vis02] . The crucial result of [Vis02] is providing an algorithm that as input, gives a non-modal proposition A and returns its best NNIL approximation A * from below, i.e., IPC ⊢ A * → A and for all NNIL formulae B such that IPC ⊢ B → A, we have IPC ⊢ B → A * . Also for all Σ 1 -substitutions σ, we have HA ⊢ σ HA (✷A ↔ ✷A * ) [Vis02] . The precise definition of the class NNIL of modal propositions is NNIL := {A | ρA ≤ 1}, in which the complexity measure ρ, is defined inductively as follows:
• ρ(✷A) = ρ(p) = ρ(⊥) = ρ(⊤) = 0, for an arbitrary atomic variables p and modal proposition A, 
For a set X of modal propositions, we also define [A] 
The NNIL-algorithm
For each modal proposition A, the proposition A * is defined inductively as follows [Vis02] :
we have several sub-cases. In the following, an occurrence of E in D is called an outer occurrence, if E is neither in the scope of an implication nor in the scope of a boxed formula.
(a) C contains an outer occurrence of a conjunction. In this case, there is some formula J(q) such that
• q is a propositional variable not occurring in A.
• q is outer in J and occurs exactly once.
Now set C 1 := J[q|D], C 2 := J[q|E] and A 1 := B → C 1 , A 2 := B → C 2 and finally, define
contains an outer occurrence of a disjunction. In this case, there is some formula J(q) such that
• q is outer in J and occurs exactly once. Let Z := {E | E → F ∈ X} ∪ {C} and define:
Proof. See [AM18, Theorem. 4.5] . ✷
The TNNIL-algorithm Definition 3.27. TNNIL (Thoroughly NNIL) is the smallest class of propositions such that
• TNNIL contains all atomic propositions,
• if all → occurring in A are contained in the scope of a ✷ (or equivalently A ∈ NOI) and A, B ∈ TNNIL, then A → B ∈ TNNIL.
Let TNNIL ✷ indicates the set of all the propositions like A(✷B 1 , . . . , ✷B n ), such that A(p 1 , . . . , p n ) is an arbitrary non-modal proposition and B 1 , . . . , B n ∈ TNNIL.
Here we define A + to be the TNNIL-formula approximating A. Informally speaking, to find A + , we first compute A * and then replace all outer boxed formula ✷B in A by ✷B + . More precisely, we define A + by induction on the maximum number of nesting ✷'s. Suppose that A ′ (p 1 , . . . , p n ) and ✷B 1 , . . . , ✷B n are such that A = A ′ [p 1 |✷B 1 , . . . , p n |✷B n ], where A ′ is a non-modal proposition and p 1 , . . . , p n are fresh atomic variables (not occurred in A). It is clear that each B i has less number of nesting ✷'s and then we can define A + := (A ′ ) * [p 1 |✷B + 1 , . . . , p n |✷B + n ]. For a modal proposition A, let B(p 1 , . . . , p n ) is the unique (modulo permutation of p i ) non-modal proposition such that A := B(✷C 1 , . . . , ✷C n ). Then define A − := B(✷C + 1 , . . . , ✷C + n ). Next we may define the theory iH σ as follows: Definition 3.28. We define the Visser's axiom schema
Then define the following modal systems:
Remark 3.29. The definitions of iH σ in [AM18, sec. 4.3] and iH * * σ in [AM19, def. 3.16 ] (which were called iH * σ there) are presented in some other equivalent way. For the sake of simplicity of definitions, we preferred Definition 3.28 here. To see an axiomatization for iH * * σ , we refer the reader to [AM19] .
Proof. By definition of (.) + , for every C we have 
Proof. We use induction on the complexity of A:
• A is atomic: then A l = A and A ✷↑ = ✷ . A. Hence by CP a we have the desired equivalency.
• A is boxed: (✷A) l = ✷A = (✷A) ✷↑ .
Hence by induction hypothesis we have the desired result.
C ✷↑ ) and hence induction hypothesis implies the desired result.
We have the following equivalences in iK4 + CP a :
Proof. Use induction on the complexity of A. The only nontrivial case is when A = ✷B. We have the following equivalences in iK4 + Le + + CP a : 
Proof. Both statements proved by induction on proofs. The only non-trivial case is when A is an axiom instance of the form ✷A such that iGLC ⊢ A. In this case, Theorem 3.34 implies iGLLe + ⊢ A.
Hence by necessitation which is available in iGLLe + we have iGLLe + ⊢ ✷A. Hence iGLLe + P ⊢ A and iGLLe + SP ⊢ A. ✷
Intuitionistic Modal Kripke Semantics
Let us first review results and notations from [Iem01] which will be used here. Assume two binary relations R and S on a set. Define α(R ;S)γ iff there exists some β such that αRβ and βSγ. We use the binary relation symbol always as a reflexive relation and ≺ for the irreflexive part of , i.e. u ≺ v holds iff u v and u = v. Moreover we use the mirror image of a relational symbol for its inverse, e.g. ≻ for ≺ −1 and so on. A Kripke model K, for intuitionistic modal logic, is a quadruple (K, , ❁, V ), such that K is a set (we call its elements as nodes), (K, ≺) is a partial ordering, ❁ is a binary relation on K such that ( ; ❁) ⊆ ❁, and V is a binary relation between nodes and atomic variables such that αV p and α β implies βV p. Then we can extend V to the modal language with ❁ corresponding to ✷ and for intuitionistic →. More precisely, we define inductively as an extension of V as follows:
• K, α p iff αV p, for atomic variable p,
Also we define the local truth in this way:
• K, α |= p iff αV p, for atomic variable p,
The classical truth K, α |= c A is defined similar to K, α |= A, except for the boxed case:
For a boolean interpretation I, we also define the local I-truth K, α, I |= A and the classical I-truth K, α, I |= c A, similar to K, α |= A, and K, α |= A, except for atomic variables p which we define:
Remark 3.36. Note that when we consider the classical truth for a Kripke model K = (K, ❁, , V ), we are ignoring the from K and it would collapse to the well known Kripke semantic for the classical modal logic K c := (K, ⊑, V ). The same argument holds for the classical I-truth, except for the valuation V , which should be modified according to I, more precisely, K, α,
In the rest of paper, we may simply write α A for K, α A, if no confusion is likely. By an induction on the complexity of A, one can observe that α A implies β A for all A and α β. We define the following notions.
• We say that α is ❁-branching, if the set of immediate successors of α is not singleton.
• A Kripke model is finite if its set of nodes is finite.
• (α❁) indicates the set of successors of α, and (α≺) and (α ) are defined similarly.
• α is complete if (α❁) ⊆ (α≺). Also we say that α is atom-complete if α p and α ❁ β implies β p, for every atomic variable p.
• Let ϕ indicates some property for nodes in K and X ⊆ K. We say that K is X-ϕ, if every α ∈ X has the property ϕ. If X = {α}, we may use α-ϕ instead. We say that K has the property ϕ, or simply "is ϕ", if it is K-ϕ. For example if we set Suc := α∈K (α❁), Suc-classical means that every ❁-accessible node is classical. Iem01] . Note that α ❁ ; β iff there is some δ such that α ❁ δ β.
• We say that K has tree frame, if (K, ≺ ∪ ❁) is tree. A tree is a partial order (X, <) such that for every x ∈ X, the set {y ∈ X : y ≤ x} is finite linearly ordered.
• K is called semi-perfect iff it is (1) with finite tree frame, (2) brilliant, (3) neat and (4) ❁ is irreflexive and transitive. We say that K is perfect if it is semi-perfect and complete. Note that every quasi-classical Kripke model with finite tree frame is perfect.
• Suppose X is a set of propositions that is closed under sub-formulae (we call such X adequate). An X-saturated set of propositions Γ with respect to some logic L is a consistent subset of X such that Proof. For iGLC see [AM18, Corollary 4.27] . iGLCT is similar and left to the reader. ✷ Lemma 3.40. Let A be a modal proposition and K = (K, , ❁, V ) be a semi-perfect Kripke model. Then for every quasi-classical node α ∈ K we have
Proof. We use induction on the complexity of A. The only non-trivial case is when
we are done. Otherwise, K, α B ✷ and K, α C ✷ and hence by induction hypothesis we have K, α |= B ✷ and K, α |= C ✷ and we are done. For the other way around, let
Corollary 3.41. Let A be a modal proposition and K is a semi-perfect quasi-classical Kripke model. Then for every node α we have
Proof. By Lemma 3.40, for every node α we have K, α A ✷ iff K, α |= A ✷ . One can easily observe by induction on the height of the node α ∈ K that K,
Corollary 3.42. Let A be a modal proposition and K is a semi-perfect quasi-classical Kripke model. Then for every node α we have
The Smorýnski Operation
In this subsection, we define the Smoryński operation on Kripke models [Smo85] . Given a Kripke model K = (K, , ❁, V ) and some fixed node α ∈ K, define K ′ := (K ′ , ′ , ❁ ′ , V ′ ) as the Kripke model constituted by adding one fresh node α ′ to K. All nodes of K ′ other than α ′ , forces the same atomic variables and have the same accessibility relationships as they did in K. Also α ′ imitates all relationships of α. More precisely K ′ is constituted as follows:
Then we define K (n) and α n inductively:
• K (0) := K and α 0 := α,
• K (n+1) := K (n) ′ and α n+1 is defined as the fresh node which is added to K (n) in the definition of K (n) ′ .
Lemma 3.43. Let K be a Kripke model which is A ✷↓ -sound at the quasi-classical node α. Then for every subformula B of A ✷↓ and arbitrary boolean interpretation I we have 
• if α ∈ X, τ is some L ✷ -substitution and T is some recursively axiomatizable arithmetical theory, then α T • τ ∈ X.
Note that the substitution α T • τ is defined on atomic variable p in this way:
Let V 0 be a modal theory. We define the Γ-arithmetical completeness of V 0 with respect to T relative in U as follows:
Similarly we define the Arithmetical soundness AS Γ (V 0 ; T, U) as follows:
When Γ is the set of all arithmetical sentences, we may omit the subscript Γ in the notations
In the following definition, we formalize reduction of the arithmetical completeness of V 0 to V ′ 0 :
Definition 4.1. Let T and T ′ be consistent recursively axiomatizable and U and U ′ be strong enough arithmetical theories. Also let Γ and Γ ′ be sets of arithmetical sentences and V 0 , V ′ 0 be modal theories. We say that f,f propositionally reduces
We say that
Following theorems are what one expect from the reduction:
Theorem 4.2. The reduction of arithmetical completenesses is a transitive reflexive relation.
Proof. The reflexivity is trivial and left to the reader. For the transitivity, let
, did not used in the proof of arithmetical completeness of V 0 in Theorem 4.3. The only usage of this condition, is to restrict the way one may computef A (α) from α: only propositional substitutions are allowed to be composed by α to producef A (α). If we remove this restriction from the definition, we would have a trivial reduction: every arithmetical completeness would be reducible to everyone. 
is not enough for reduction of the arithmetical completenesses. This is simply because f does not have anything to do with the arithmetical substitutions. So one may not be able to translate an arithmetical refutation from PL Γ ′ (T ′ , U ′ ) to a refutation from PL Γ (T, U), via propositional translations. If we remove the condition 3 and replace second item by
would be reducible to every arithmetical completeness via the following vicious reduction:
Notation 4.7. In the rest of the paper, we are going to characterize several provability logics. Our main tool for proving their arithmetical completeness is the reduction of arithmetical completenesses Theorem 4.3. The notation
Proof. Direct consequence of Corollary 4.5 and computability of f . ✷
Two special cases
In later applications, always we consider two simple cases of reduction f,f (Definition 4.1) to provide new arithmetical completenesses:
• Identity: in this case we considerf A as identity function and f (A) is some propositional translation like (.) ✷ or (.) ✷↓ .
• Substitution: in this case, we let f (A) as some L ✷ -substitution, possibly depending on A. Alsō
5 Relative Σ 1 -provability logics for HA
In this section, we will characterize PL Σ 1 (HA, N), i.e. the truth Σ 1 -provability logic of HA, and PL Σ 1 (HA, PA), i.e. the Σ 1 -provability logic of HA, relative to PA. We also show that PL Σ 1 (HA, N) is hardest among the Σ 1 -provability logics of HA relative in HA, PA, N. In other words:
Diagram 1: Reductions for relative provability logics of HA
Kripke Semantic
For the simplicity of notations, in this proof, let
and ⊢ indicates derivablity in iGL + ϕ.
One side is trivial. For the other way around, assume that iGL ϕ → A. We will construct some perfect Kripke model K = (K, ❁, , V ) such that K, α A, which by soundness of iGLC for finite brilliant models with ❁⊆≺, we have the desired result. The proof is almost identical to the proof of Theorem 3.38 in [AM18, Theorem 4.26], but to be self-contained, we repeat it here.
Let Sub(A) be the set of sub-formulae of A. Then define
It is obvious that X is a finite adequate set. We define K = (K, , ❁, V ) as follows. Take K as the set of all X-saturated sets with respect to iGL + ϕ, and is the subset relation over K. Define α ❁ β iff for all ✷B ∈ X, ✷B ∈ α implies B ∈ β, and also there exists some ✷C ∈ β \ α. Finally define αV p iff p ∈ α, for atomic p.
It only remains to show that K is a finite brilliant Kripke model with ❁⊆≺ which refutes A. To this end, we first show by induction on
The other direction is easier to prove and we leave it to reader. Let β 0 := {D ∈ X | α ⊢ ✷D}. If β 0 , ✷C ⊢ C, since by definition of β 0 , we have α ⊢ ✷β 0 and hence by Löb's axiom, α ⊢ ✷C, which is in contradiction with ✷C ∈ α. Hence β 0 , ✷C C and so there exists some X-saturated set β such that β C, β ⊇ β 0 ∪ {✷C}. Hence β ∈ K and α ❁ β. Then by the induction hypothesis, β C and hence α ✷C.
Since iGL + ϕ A, by Lemma 3.37, there exists some X-saturated set α ∈ K such that α A, and hence by the above argument we have α A.
K trivially satisfies all the properties of finite brilliant Kripke model with ❁ ⊆ ≺. As a sample, we show that why ❁ ⊆ ≺ holds. Assume α ❁ β and let B ∈ α. If B = ✷C for some C, then by definition, C ∈ β and since C → ✷C is a conjunct in ϕ, we have β ⊢ ✷C and we are done. So assume B is not a boxed formula. Then by definition of X, we have ✷B ∈ X and since B → ✷B is a conjunct in ϕ, we have α ⊢ ✷B and hence by definition of ❁, it is the case that B ∈ β. This shows α ⊆ β and hence α β. But α is not equal to β, because α ❁ β implies existence of some
Proof. Let iGLC ⊢ A. Hence by Lemma 5.1 for some finite set X of subformulas of
. iGLCPC a is sound and complete for local truth at quasi-classical nodes in perfect Kripke models. More precisely, we have iGLCPC a ⊢ A iff K, α |= A for every perfect Kripke model K and the quasi-classical node α.
Proof. The soundness part easily derived by the soundness of iGLC and left to the reader.
Since local truth at α is not affected by changing the set of -accessible nodes from α, it is enough to prove the completeness part only for the perfect Kripke models. Let iGLCPC a A. Let A ′ be a boolean equivalent of A which is a conjunction of implications E → F in which E is a conjunction of a set of atomics or boxed propositions and F is a disjunction of atomics or boxed proposition. Evidently such A ′ exists for every A. Hence iGLCPC a A ′ . Then there must be some conjunct E → F of A ′ such that iGLCPC a (E → F ) ✷ , E is a conjunction of atomic and boxed propositions and F is a disjunction of atomic and boxed propositions. Hence iGL + CP a + ✷CP (E → F ) ✷ and by Lemma 5.2 we have iGLC (E → F ) ✷ . By Theorem 3.38, there exists some perfect Kripke model K = (K, , ❁, V ) such that K, α (E → F ) ✷ for some α ∈ K. Since iGLC is sound for K, we have K, α E → F . Hence there exists some β α such that K, β E and K, β F . Then by definition of local truth we have K, β |= E and K, β |= F . Then K, β |= E → F . Hence K, β |= A, as desired. ✷ Proof. Both directions are non-trivial and proved contra-positively. For the soundness part, assume that K, α |= A ✷↓ for some perfect Kripke model K := (K, , ❁, V ) which is A ✷↓ -sound at the quasiclassical node α ∈ K. Since derivability is finite, it is enough to show that for every finite set Γ of modal propositions we have iGLCPC a
By Theorem 5.3 and Lemma 3.43, it is enough to find some number i such that
Let us define n i and m i as the number of propositions in the sets N i := {B ∈ Γ :
We use induction as follows. As induction hypothesis, assume that for any number i with n i < k there is some 0 ≤ j ≤ 1 + n i such that
If m i = 0, we may let j = 0 and by Lemma 3.43 we have eq. (5.1) as desired. So let B ∈ Γ such that K (i) , α i |= ✷B ∧ ¬B. We have two sub-cases:
• m i+1 = 0: observe in this case that eq. (5.1) holds for j = 1.
• m i+1 > 0: in this case we have n i+1 < k and hence by application of the induction hypothesis with i := i + 1, we get some 0 ≤ j ′ ≤ 1 + n i+1 such that
Hence if we let j := j ′ + 1 we have 0 ≤ j ≤ 1 + n i and eq. (5.1), as desired.
For the completeness part, assume that iGLCSPC a A ✷↓ . Hence Proof. First observe that by Theorems 5.3 and 5.5, we have iGLCSPC a ⊢ A ✷↓ iff
Hence the decidability of iGLCPC a (Corollary 5.4) implies the decidability of iGLCSPC a . ✷
Arithmetical interpretations
The following theorem is the main result in [AM18] :
Here we bring some essential facts and definitions from [AM18] . Let us fix some perfect Kripke model K 0 = (K 0 , ❁ 0 , 0 , V 0 ) with the quasi-classical root α 0 and its extension K := K ′ 0 = (K, , ❁, V ) by the Smoryński operation with the new quasi-classical root α 1 (which was called α 0 in [AM18] ) and define a recursive function F , called Solovay function, as we did in [AM18] . We have the following definitions and facts from [AM18] : (later we refer to them simply as e.g. "item 1",)
1. The function F is provably total in HA and hence we may use the function symbol F inside HA and stronger theories.
2. The Σ 1 -substitution σ is defined in this way:
5. For a modal proposition A when we use A in a context which it is expected to be some first-order formula, like HA ⊢ A, we should replace A with the first-order sentence σHA (A). Lemma 5.18 & 5.19] 7. For each B ∈ Sub(Γ) ∩ TNNIL and α ∈ K such that α ✷B,
For every
8. N |= L = α 1 and PA + L = α is consistent for every α ∈ K. [AM18, Corollaries 5.20 & 5.24 and Lemma 5.23]
Proof. First observe that by Π 2 -conservativity of PA over HA (Lemma 3.13), it is enough to prove this lemma in PA instead of HA. Then by "item 4", it is enough to show that
We use induction on the complexity of A. Since A ∈ NOI we do not consider the → case in the induction steps: • A = ✷B: first note that by "item 6", PA ⊢ ∃x F (x) = α → A for every α A (here actually we need α 1 A). Hence
For the other direction, it is enough (by "item 4") to show that for every β ∈ K such that K, β A we have PA ⊢ A → L = β or equivalently PA ⊢ L = β → ¬A, which holds by "item 7". ✷ Lemma 5.9. For every A ∈ sub(Γ) and α ∈ K 0 , we have
Proof. We use induction on the complexity of A. All cases are simple and we only treat the case A = ✷B here. If K, α |= ✷B, by definition, K, α ✷B and hence by "item 6" we have the desired result. If also K, α |= ✷B, by definition, K, α ✷B and hence by "item 7" we have the desired result. ✷
Proof. We prove this by induction on the complexity of B ∈ sub(A ✷↓ ).
• B is atomic, conjunction or disjunction: easy and left to the reader.
• B = E → F : it is easy to show the first two derivations and we leave them to the reader. For the third one, assume that K, α 1 E → F . If K, α 1 F we have the desired result by induction hypothesis. So let K, α 1 F and Hence K, α 1 E. Hence by Lemma 5.8, we have HA ⊢ E → α E ∃x F (x) = α. On the other hand by "item 6" we have HA ⊢ α E ∃x F (x) = α → F . Hence we have HA → E → F . 
Arithmetical Completeness
Definition 5.11. Define the following modal systems:
• iH σ P := iH σ plus P,
• iH σ SP := iH σ P plus S,
Obviously iH σ SP * and iH σ P * are closed under modus ponens.
Theorem 5.12. iH σ P = PL Σ 1 (HA, PA), i.e. iH σ P is the relative Σ 1 -provability logic of HA in PA.
Proof. The soundness easily deduced by use of the soundness of the iH σ for arithmetical interpretations in HA (see Theorem 6.3 in [AM18] ). For the other way around, let iH σ P A. Then iH σ P A − in which A − ∈ TNNIL ✷ and iH σ ⊢ A ↔ A − . Then iGLLe + P A − and hence by Theorem 3.35 we have iGLCPC a A − . By Theorem 5.3, there is some perfect Kripke model K 0 with the quasi-classical root α 0 such that K 0 , α 0 |= A − . Let σ be the Σ 1 -substitution as provided in Section 5.2 for the Kripke model K 0 and its Smoryński extension K with Γ := {A − }. Then by Lemma 5.9 we have HA ⊢ L = α 0 → σHA (¬A − ). Since iH σ ⊢ A ↔ A − , by soundness part of Theorem 5.7 we have HA ⊢ L = α 0 → σHA (¬A). Hence by "item 8" we may deduce PA σHA (A), as desired. 
Reductions
In this subsection we will show that PL Σ 1 (HA, PA) ≤ PL Σ 1 (HA, HA) ≤ PL Σ 1 (HA, N)
First some definition:
Definition 5.14. For A ∈ L ✷ we define A ¬↓ , A ¬↑ and A ¬ as follows: For an arithmetical formula A we have these additional clauses for the definition of A ¬ : Proof. By Theorems 5.7 and 5.13 we have iH σ = PL Σ 1 (HA, HA) and PL Σ 1 (HA, N) = iH σ SP. We must show AC Σ 1 (iH σ ; HA, HA) ≤ f,f AC Σ 1 (iH σ SP; HA, N). Given A ∈ L ✷ , define f (A) = ✷A andf A as identity function.
R1. Let iH σ SP ⊢ ✷A. By soundness of iH σ SP = PL Σ 1 (HA, N), for every Σ 1 -substitution σ we have N |= σ HA (✷A) and hence HA ⊢ σ HA (A) . Then by arithmetical completeness of PL Σ 1 (HA, HA), we have iH σ ⊢ A.
One also may prove this item with a direct propositional argument. For simplicity reasons, we chose the indirect way.
R2. Let N |= σ HA (✷A). Then HA σ HA (A), as desired. ✷ 6 Relative Σ 1 -provability logics for HA *
The σ 1 -provability logic of HA * , PL Σ 1 (HA * , HA * ), is already characterized [AM19] . In this section, we characterize the Σ 1 -provability logic of HA * , relative in PA and N. We also show that the following reductions hold: Each arrow in the above diagram, indicates a reduction of the completeness of the left hand side to the right one. Note that the diagram of the first row is already known by Theorems 5.19 and 5.20. Theorem 6.1. iH σ SP * = PL Σ 1 (HA * , N) ≤ PL Σ 1 (HA, N) = iH σ SP. (See Definition 5.11) Proof. By Theorem 5.13 we have PL Σ 1 (HA, N) = iH σ SP. It is enough to prove the arithmetical soundness AS Σ 1 (iH σ SP * ; HA * , N) and the reduction AC Σ 1 (iH σ SP * ; HA * , N) ≤ AC Σ 1 (iH σ SP; HA, N). AS Σ 1 (iH σ SP * ; HA * , N): Let iH σ SP * ⊢ A and σ is a Σ 1 -substitution. Then iH σ SP ⊢ A ✷↓ , and then by arithmetical soundness of iH σ SP Theorem 5.13, we have N |= σ HA (A ✷↓ ). Hence Lemma 3.19 
Proof. We have the following equivalents:
Theorem 6.5. iH * * σ = PL Σ 1 (HA * , HA * ) ≤ PL Σ 1 (HA * , HA) = iH * σ . Proof. By Theorem 6.3 we have PL Σ 1 (HA * , HA) = iH * σ . It is enough to prove the arithmetical soundness AS Σ 1 (iH * * σ ; HA * , HA * ) and the reduction AC Σ 1 (iH * * σ ; HA * , HA * ) ≤ AC Σ 1 (iH * σ ; HA * , HA). AS Σ 1 (iH * * σ ; HA * , HA * ): Let iH * * σ ⊢ A and σ is a Σ 1 -substitution. Then iH σ ⊢ A ✷ , and then by arithmetical soundness of iH σ Theorem 5.7, we have HA ⊢ σ HA (A ✷ ). Hence Lemma 3.18 implies HA ⊢ σ HA * (A) HA , which implies HA * ⊢ σ HA * (A) . For the proof of AC Σ 1 (iH σ SP * ; HA * , N) ≤ f,f AC Σ 1 (iH σ SP; HA, N), define f (A) := A ✷↑ andf A as identity function. R1. Let iH * σ ⊢ A ✷↑ . Then by Lemma 6.4 we have iH * * σ ⊢ A, as desired. R2. Let HA σ HA * (A ✷↑ ). Hence by Lemma 3.17 we have HA (σ HA * (A)) HA , which implies HA * σ HA * (A), as desired. ✷ Theorem 6.6. iH σ P * = PL Σ 1 (HA * , PA) ≤ PL Σ 1 (HA * , HA) = iH * σ .
Proof. iH σ P * = PL Σ 1 (HA * , PA) and iH * σ = PL Σ 1 (HA * , HA), by Theorems 6.2 and 6.3 holds. Given Proof. By Theorems 6.1 and 6.5 we have PL Σ 1 (HA * , N) = iH σ SP * and iH * * σ = PL Σ 1 (HA * , HA * ). We must show AC Σ 1 (iH * * σ ; HA * , HA * ) ≤ f,f AC Σ 1 (iH σ SP * ; HA, N). Given A ∈ L ✷ , define f (A) = ✷A and f A as identity function.
R1. Let iH σ SP * ⊢ ✷A. By soundness of iH σ SP * = PL Σ 1 (HA * , N), for every Σ 1 -substitution σ we have N |= σ HA * (✷A) and hence HA * ⊢ σ HA * (A) . Then by arithmetical completeness of PL Σ 1 (HA * , HA * ), we have iH * * σ ⊢ A. One also may prove this item with a direct propositional argument. For simplicity reasons, we chose the indirect way. Theorem 7.1. We have the following provability logics:
• GL is the provability logic of PA, i.e. PL(PA, PA) = GL. [Sol76] • GLS is the truth provability logic of PA, i.e. PL(PA, N) = GLS. [Sol76] • GLC a is the Σ 1 -provability logic of PA, i.e. PL Σ 1 (PA, PA) = GLC a . [Vis82] • GLSC a is the truth Σ 1 -provability logic of PA, i.e. PL Σ 1 (PA, N) = GLSC a . [Vis82] Definition 7.2. A propositional modal substitution τ is called (.) ✷↓ -substitution, if for every atomic variable p, there is some B such that iK4 + CP a ⊢ τ (p) ↔ B ✷↓ and iK4 ⊢ ✷ . B ✷↓ ↔ B ✷ . Lemma 7.3. For every (.) ✷↓ -substitution τ and every modal proposition
Proof. First by induction on the complexity of B we show iK4V ⊢ τ (B ✷ ) ↔ τ (B) ✷ . All cases are easy, except for atomic B, which holds by existence of some C such that iK4V ⊢ τ (B) ↔ C ✷↓ and iK4 ⊢ ✷ . C ✷↓ ↔ C ✷ . Then we use induction on the complexity of A to deduce the second assertion of this lemma. The only non-trivial cases are atomic and boxed cases:
✷
The following remark, will be helpful for later reductions of provability logics in section 8. 
Proof. The proof of second item is similar to the first one. Here we only treat the first item. Obviously, GL ⊢ A implies GLS ⊢ ✷A. For a direct proof of the other way around, one may use of Smorýnski's operation. However, now that we enjoy the arithmetical soundness of PL(PA, N) = GLS, from GLS ⊢ ✷A for every σ we have N |= σ PA (✷A) and hence PA ⊢ σ PA (A) . From the arithmetical completeness of GL = PL(PA, PA), we get GL ⊢ A. ✷
In the following theorem, we will show that GLSC a is the hardest provability logic among GL, GLC a , GLS and GLSC a .
Theorem 7.6. We have the following reductions:
Proof. We prove each item separately: In this subsection, we illustrate how to reduce the arithmetical completeness of GLSC a to that of iH σ SP. First some definitions and lemmas:
Definition 7.7. For a modal proposition A let A ‡ indicates the classically equivalent formula of the form
and E i,j , F i,j are atomic or boxed formulas. Also for atomic p we have p ‡ = p and (✷E) ‡ = ✷(E ‡ ). Then define A † in this way:
• (.) † commutes with ∨, ∧, →,
• p † = p for atomic p,
• (✷A) † = ✷A ‡ Lemma 7.8. For every modal proposition A and arithmetical substitution α, we have
Proof. Easy and left to the reader. ✷
Proof. Let GLSC a A. Since in classical logic we have A ↔ A † , then GLSC a A † . Hence by AC Σ 1 (GLSC a ; PA, N) from 7.1, we have some Σ 1 -substitution σ such that N |= σ PA (A † ). Then Lemma 7.8 implies N |= σ HA (A † ), and hence by arithmetical soundness of iH σ SP (Theorem 5.13) we have iH σ SP A † , as desired. ✷ Lemma 7.10. For every A ∈ L ✷ , if iH σ P ⊢ A † then GLC a ⊢ A.
Proof. Let GLC a A. Since in classical logic we have A ↔ A † , then GLC a A † . Hence by AC Σ 1 (GLC a ; PA, PA) from 7.1, we have some Σ 1 -substitution σ such that PA σ PA (A † ). Then Lemma 7.8 implies PA σ HA (A † ), and hence by arithmetical soundness of iH σ P (Theorem 5.12) we have iH σ P A † , as desired. ✷ Theorem 7.11. GLSC a = PL Σ 1 (PA, N) ≤ PL Σ 1 (HA, N) = iH σ SP.
Proof. By Theorems 5.13 and 7.1 we have iH σ SP = PL Σ 1 (HA, N) and GLSC a = PL Σ 1 (PA, N) . For the reduction, let f (A) := A † andf A as identity function.
R1. If iH σ SP ⊢ A † , by Lemma 7.9 we have GLSC a ⊢ A.
R2. Holds by Lemma 7.8. ✷
Kripke Semantics
Let Suc K or simply Suc, when no confusion is likely, indicates the set of all ❁-accessible nodes in the Kripke model K.
Theorem 7.12. iGLP is sound and complete for semi-perfect Suc-classical ❁-branching Kripke models.
Proof. The soundness is easy and left to the reader. For the completeness, we first show the completeness for finite brilliant irreflexive transitive Suc-classical Kripke models. Let iGLP A. Let
and define the Kripke model K = (K, , ❁, V ) as follows:
• K is the family of all X-saturated sets with respect to iGLP.
• α β iff α ⊆ β.
• α ❁ β iff β is a maximally consistent set and {B, ✷B : ✷B ∈ α} ⊆ β and there is some
It is straightforward to show that K is actually a finite brilliant irreflexive Suc-classical Kripke model, and we leave all of them to the reader. It is enough to show that K, α B iff B ∈ α for every α ∈ K and B ∈ X. Then we may use Lemma 3.37 and find some α such that K, α A. We use induction on the complexity of B ∈ X. All inductive steps are trivial, except for B = ✷C. If ✷C ∈ α and α ❁ β, then by definition, C ∈ β and hence by induction hypothesis β C. This implies α ✷C. For the other way around, let ✷C ∈ α. Consider the set ∆ :
Hence β ❂ α and β C. Then α ✷C, as desired.
Next we use the construction method [Iem01] , to fulfil the other conditions: ❁-branching, neat and tree. Let K t := (K t , t , ❁ t , V t ) as follows:
• K t is the set of all finite sequences of pairs r := (α 0 , a 0 ), . . . (α n , a n ) such that for any i ≤ n:
(1) α i ∈ K, (2) a i ∈ {0, 1}, (3) for i < n either we have α i ≺ α i+1 or α i ❁ α i+1 . Let f 1 (r) and f 2 (r) indicate the left and right elements in the final element of the sequence r. In other words, we let (f 1 (r), f 2 (r)) be the final element of the sequence r.
• r t s iff r is an initial segment of s and f 1 (r) f 1 (s).
• r ❁ t s iff r is an initial segment of s = (α 0 , a 0 ), . . . , (α n , a n ) , e.g. r = (α 0 , a 0 ), . . . , (α k , a k ) for some k < n and α i ❁ α i+1 for some k ≤ i < n.
It is straightforward to show that K t is semi-perfect ❁-branching Suc-classical Kripke model and for every r ∈ K t and formula B we have
Theorem 7.13. iGLPC a is sound and complete for semi-perfect Suc-classical atom-complete Kripke models.
Proof. The proof is almost identical to the one for Theorem 7.12. We only explain the differences here. Define X := {B, ¬B, B ∨ ¬B : B ∈ Sub(A)} ∪ {⊥} ∪ {✷p : p ∈ Sub(A) and p is atomic} and K, the set of the nodes of Kripke model, is defined as the set of all X-saturated sets with respect to iGLPC a . We show that every α ∈ K is atom-complete. Let p be an atomic variable such that α p. Hence p ∈ α which implies p ∈ Sub (A) , and since iGLPC a ⊢ p → ✷p and α is closed under deduction, we have ✷p ∈ α. Then α ✷p and hence for every β ❂ α we have β p, as desired. ✷
Arithmetical Completeness
Theorem 7.14. iGLPC a is the relative Σ 1 -provability logic of PA in HA, i.e. PL Σ 1 (PA, HA) = iGLPC a .
Proof. The soundness is straightforward and left to the reader. For the completeness part, let iGLPC a A. Then by Theorem 7.13, there is some semi-perfect atom-complete Suc-classical Kripke model K = (K, , ❁, V ) such that K, α 0 A for some α 0 ∈ K. Without loss of generality, we may assume that K = (α 0 ) ∪ (α 0 ❁). Let K ′ = (K ′ , ′ , ❁ ′ , V ′ ) indicates the Smorýnski's extension of K at α 0 with the fresh node α 1 . For the simplicity of notations, we may use and ❁ instead of ′ and ❁ ′ . Define the recursive function F as follows. Since K ′ is a finite set, we might assign a unique numberᾱ to each node α and speak about K ′ and its relationships and ❁ inside the language of arithmetic. For simplicity of notations, we may simply use α β and α ❁ β corresponding to its equivalent arithmetical formula. Define F (0) := α 1 and
: F (n) ❁ β and r(β, n + 1) < n + 1 and (n) 0 = β β : F (n) ≺ β and F (n) ❁ β and F (r(β, n + 1)) = α 1 and r(β, n + 1) < r(F (n), n + 1) and (n) 0 = β F (n) : otherwise in which L = β is shorthand for ∃x∀y ≥ x(F (y) = F (x)), (n) 0 is the exponent of 2 in n and
Note that r(α, n) < n implies ✷ + (L = α). F is a provably total recursive function in HA, i.e. F (x) = y could be expressed as a Σ 1 -formula in the language of arithmetic and all of its expected properties are provable in HA. Hence we may use the function symbol F in the language of arithmetic.
Define the arithmetical substitution σ(p) in this way:
Consider the triple I := (K * , * , T ) as follows:
• α * β iff α β for every α, β ∈ K * . Again, by abuse of notations, we use instead of * .
• T (α) := PA + (L = α).
By Theorem 3.24 and Lemma 7.16, we have some first-order Kripke model K * = (K * , , M) such that K * HA and K * , α |= T (α). By Lemma 3.21
Hence by Lemma 3.21, for every α ∈ K * (7.2) K * , α σPA (p) ⇐⇒ K, α p
For every classical node α ∈ K * , since the Kripke model above α is just a classical Kripke model, one may repeat the Solovay's argument and show that for every modal proposition B we have
We may use Lemmas 7.18 and 7.19 and eq. (7.2) to conclude
for every modal proposition B and α ∈ K * . Since K, α 0 A, we have K * , α σPA (A), and hence HA σPA (A), as desired. ✷ Lemma 7.15. For arbitrary α, β ∈ K ′ we have
Proof. All proofs are straightforward and left to the reader. Proof. It is enough to show that PA ⊢ L = α → ✷ + (L = β) for every β α such that β ❂ α, holds. Consider some β α with β ❂ β. If β = α, by item 5 in Lemma 7.15 we have the desired result. So we may let β = α. We reason inside PA. Let L = α. Hence for some x we have F (x) = α. Then we reason inside ✷ + . By Σ 1 -completeness of PA (seeLemma 3.11), we have F (x) = α. Assume that L = β. Let x 0 be the first number such that F (x 0 ) = β. Hence for some r such that ✷ + r (L = β) holds, we have F (r) = α 1 . Then r ≤ x and hence by Lemma 3.10 we may deduce L = β, in contradiction with L = β. ✷ Lemma 7.18. For every α in K and proposition B we have
Proof. Let K, α ✷B. Hence for every β ❂ α we have K, β B. Since every β ❂ α is classical, by eq. (7.3) we have PA ⊢ α❁β L = β → σPA (B). Hence PA ⊢ ✷ + ( α❁β L = β) → σPA (✷B). Lemma 7.17 implies PA ⊢ L = α → σPA (✷B). ✷ Lemma 7.19. For every α in K and proposition B we have
Proof. Let K, α ✷B. Hence for every β ❂ α we have K, β B. Since every β ❂ α is classical, by eq. 
Reductions
Lemma 7.20. For every
Proof. Let iGLPC a A. Since in iK4 + ✷PEM we have A ↔ A † , then iGLPC a A † . Hence by AC Σ 1 (iGLPC a ; PA, PA) from Theorem 7.14, we have some Σ 1 -substitution σ such that HA σ PA (A † ). Then Lemma 7.8 implies HA σ HA (A † ), and hence by arithmetical soundness of iH σ (Theorem 5.7) we have iH σ A † , as desired. ✷ Theorem 7.21. iGLPC a = PL Σ 1 (PA, HA) ≤ PL Σ 1 (HA, HA) = iH σ .
Proof. The soundness of iGLPC a is straightforward and left to the reader. Also by Theorem 5.7, we have PL Σ 1 (HA, HA) = iH σ . So, it is enough to show AC Σ 1 (iGLPC a ; PA, HA) ≤ f,f AC Σ 1 (iH σ ; HA, HA). Proof. We already have GLC a = PL Σ 1 (PA, PA) and PL Σ 1 (HA, PA) = iH σ P by Theorems 5.12 and 7.1. So, it is enough to show AC Σ 1 (GLC a ; PA, PA) ≤ f,f AC Σ 1 (iH σ P; HA, PA). Define f (A) := A † andf A as identity function.
R1. Let iH σ P ⊢ A † . By Lemma 7.20 we have GLC a ⊢ A.
R2. Use Lemma 7.8. ✷
The arithmetical completeness of iGLP will be reduced to the one for iGLPC a via the following lemma. This argument is similar to the one explained in [AM15]. One may use a direct proof for the arithmetical completeness of iGLP, similar to what we do for iGLPC a . However this is not enough for our later use insection 8 of the arithmetical completeness of iGLP.
Lemma 7.23. For every modal proposition A, iGLP ⊢ A iff for every propositional modal (.) ✷↓substitution τ (Definition 7.2) we have iGLPC a ⊢ τ (A).
Proof. One direction holds since iGLP is closed under substitutions and is included in iGLPC a . For the other way around, let iGLP A. By Theorem 7.12, there is some Suc-classical, semi-perfect ❁-branching Kripke model K = (K, , ❁, V ) such that K A. For every α ∈ K, let p α be a fresh atomic variable such that for every α = β we have p α = p β . For every α ∈ K, define A α via induction on the ≺-height of α (the maximum number n such that a sequence α = α 0 ≺ . . . ≺ α n exists). So as induction hypothesis, let A β for every β ≻ α is defined.
Then by induction on the complexity of the modal proposition B, we show
• B is atomic variable: For every α ∈ K such that K, α B, by Lemma 7.24 we haveK, α A α and henceK, α τ (p). Also ifK, α τ (B), then for some β ∈ K we have K, β B andK, α A β . Hence by Lemma 7.24 we have β α, which implies K, α B, as desired.
• All the other cases are trivial and left to the reader.
Then we haveK τ (A) . Obviously the Kripke modelK inherits all properties from K and moreover it is atom-complete. Hence by soundness part of the Theorem 7.13, iGLPC a τ (A), as desired. ✷ Lemma 7.24. LetK and A α , as defined in the proof of Lemma 7.23. For every α, β ∈ K we havē K, α A β iff α β.
Proof. We use induction on the ≺-height of β. As induction hypothesis, let for every β ≻ β 0 and α ∈ K we haveK, α A β iff β α. Note that by induction hypothesis we haveK, β A + β0 iff β ≻ β 0 .
• (α β 0 impliesK, α A β0 ): It is enough to show thatK, β 0 A β0 . Then for evey α β 0 we haveK, α A β0 , as desired. By definition ofK, we haveK, β 0 p β 0 . Consider some γ ⊒ β 0 . Again by definition ofK, we haveK, β 0 ✷¬p γ and for every δ ≻ β 0 we haveK, δ A + β0 . Hencē K, β 0 ✷¬p γ → A + β0 . This argument shows thatK, β 0 A β0 , as desired.
we are done. So let β 0 α and β 0 ❁ α. Hence for arbitrary γ ⊒ β 0 we haveK, α ¬✷¬p γ . This by Suc-classicality, implies that there is some δ ❂ α such thatK, δ p γ . Then we have γ( ∪ ❁)δ.
By Suc-classicality, we have γ ⊑ δ. SinceK is with tree frame, we have either α ⊑ γ or γ ⊑ α.
On the other hand, sinceK is ❁-branching, there must be some γ ❂ β 0 which is ❁-incomparable with α, a contradiction with our previous argument. Proof. The arithmetical soundness of iGLP is straightforward and left to the reader. Also by Theorem 7.21 we have PL Σ 1 (PA, HA) = iGLPC a . It remains to show AC(iGLP; PA, HA) ≤ f,f AC Σ 1 (iGLP; PA, HA)
Then by Lemma 7.23 there is some substitution τ such that iGLPC a τ (A) . Define the function f as follows: Proof. By Theorems 7.1 and 7.25 we have PL Σ 1 (PA, N) = GLSC a and iGLPC a = PL Σ 1 (PA, HA). We must show AC Σ 1 (iGLP; PA, HA) ≤ f,f AC Σ 1 (GLSC a ; PA, N). Given A ∈ L ✷ , define f (A) = ✷A and f A as identity function.
R1. Let GLSC a ⊢ ✷A. By soundness of iH σ SP = PL Σ 1 (HA, N), for every Σ 1 -substitution σ we have N |= σ HA (✷A) and hence HA ⊢ σ HA (A) . Then by arithmetical completeness of PL Σ 1 (HA, HA), we have iH σ ⊢ A.
One also may prove this item with a direct propositional argument. For simplicity reasons, we chose the indirect way. Proof. By Theorem 7.1 we have GLC a = PL Σ 1 (PA, PA) and PL Σ 1 (PA, N) = GLSC a . We must show
R1. Let GLSC a ⊢ ✷A. By soundness of GLSC a = PL Σ 1 (PA, N), for every Σ 1 -substitution σ we have N |= σ PA (✷A) and hence PA ⊢ σ PA (A) . Then by arithmetical completeness of PL Σ 1 (PA, PA), we have GLC a ⊢ A.
One also may prove this item with a direct propositional argument, using Kripke semantics. For simplicity reasons, we chose the indirect way. Proof. Similar to the proof of Theorem 7.29 and left to the reader. ✷ 8 Relative provability logics for PA *
In this section, we characterize several relative provability logics for PA * via reductions. All reductions are shown at once in the diagram 4. The head of arrow reduces to its tail, via some simple reduction (section 4.1). The translation f in the reduction, is shown over the arrow lines and the number which appears under arrow, is the corresponding theorem.
Kripke Semantics
In the following lemma, we will show that the axioms CP and TP are local over iGL, i.e. whenever we can deduce some proposition A from CP + TP in iGL, then we may deduce it by those instances of CP and TP which use the subformulas of A: 
7.27
Diagram 4: Reductions for relative provability logics of PA * Proof. For the simplicity of notations, in this proof, let
and ⊢ indicates derivablity in iGL + ϕ. One side is trivial. For the other way around, assume that iGL ϕ → A. We will construct some finite Kripke model K = (K, ❁, , V ) with ❁=≺ such that K, α A, which by soundness of iGLCT for finite Kripke models with ≺=❁, we have the desired result. The proof is almost identical to the proof of Theorem 3.38 in [AM18, Theorem 4.26] . To be self-contained, we elaborate it here.
It is obvious that X is a finite adequate set. We define K = (K, , ❁, V ) as follows. Define
• K as the set of all X-saturated sets with respect to iGL + ϕ,
• α ❁ β iff {D : ✷D ∈ α} ⊆ β and α β,
• αV p iff p ∈ α, for atomic p.
K trivially satisfies all the properties of finite Kripke model with ❁ = ≺. So we must only show that K A. To this end, we first show by induction on B ∈ X that B ∈ α iff α B, for each α ∈ K. The only non-trivial cases are B = ✷C and B = E → F .
• B = ✷C: Let ✷C ∈ α. We must show α ✷C. The other direction is easier to prove and we leave it to reader. Let β 0 := {D ∈ X | α ⊢ ✷D}. If β 0 , ✷C ⊢ C, since by definition of β 0 , we have α ⊢ ✷β 0 and hence by Löb's axiom, α ⊢ ✷C, which is in contradiction with ✷C ∈ α. Hence β 0 , ✷C C and so there exists some X-saturated set β such that β C, β ⊇ β 0 ∪{✷C}. Hence β ∈ K and α ❁ β. Then by the induction hypothesis, β C and hence α ✷C.
• Let E → F ∈ α. Then F ∈ α. If E ∈ α, by induction hypothesis we have α E and α F , and hence α E → F , as desired. So we may let E ∈ α. Define β 0 := {D : ✷D ∈ α}. If α ⊢ β 0 → (E → F ), then α ⊢ ✷(E → F ) and hence by TP, either we have α ⊢ E or α ⊢ E → F , a contradiction. So we may let α β 0 → (E → F ), and use Lemma 3.37 to find β ⊇ β 0 ∪ α ∪ {E} as some X-saturated node in K. Hence α ❁ β which implies α ≺ β and by induction hypothesis β E and β F , which implies α E → F , as desired.
Since iGL + ϕ A, by Lemma 3.37, there exists some X-saturated set α ∈ K such that α A, and hence by the above argument we have α A. ✷ and define the Kripke model K = (K, , ❁, V ) as follows:
• K is the family of all X-saturated sets with respect to iGLCT.
• α ❁ β iff α = β and {B, ✷B : ✷B ∈ α} ⊆ β and β is X-saturated with respect to iGLCT.
• α ≺ β iff α β and either α ❁ β or γ ❁ α, for every γ ∈ K.
It is straightforward to show that K is a finite brilliant irreflexive transitive Suc-quasi-classical Kripke model. We leave them to the reader. We only show that K, α B iff B ∈ α for every α ∈ K and B ∈ X. Then by Lemma 3.37 one may find some α ∈ K such that K, α A, as desired.
Use induction on the complexity of B ∈ X. All inductive steps are trivial, except for:
• B = ✷C: If ✷C ∈ α and α ❁ β, then by definition, C ∈ β and hence by induction hypothesis β C. This implies α ✷C. For the other way around, let ✷C ∈ α. Consider the set ∆ := {E, ✷E : ✷E ∈ α}. If iGLCT ⊢ ∆ → (✷C → C), then iGLCT ⊢ ✷( ∆) → ✷C. Since iK4+α ⊢ ✷( ∆), we may deduce iGLCT+α ⊢ ✷C, a contradiction. Hence iGLCT ( ∆∧✷C) → C. By Lemma 3.37, there exists some X-saturated set β ⊇ ∆ ∪ {✷C} with respect to iGLCT such that C ∈ β. Hence β ∈ K and α ❁ β and C ∈ β. Induction hypothesis implies that β C and hence α ✷C.
• B = C → D: If C → D ∈ α and α β and β C, by induction hypothesis C ∈ β and hence D ∈ β. Again by induction hypothesis we have β D. This shows that α C → D. For the other way around, let C → D ∈ α. We have two cases:
-There is some γ ❁ α: Hence α is X-sturated w.r.t iGLCT. Let ∆ := {E : ✷E ∈ α}. We have tow subcases:
Since α is X-saturated with respect to iGLCT, we have either C ∈ α or C → D ∈ α. The latter is impossible, hence C ∈ α. Again by X-saturatedness of α, we can deduce D ∈ α. Hence by induction hypothesis we have α C and α D, which implies α C → D, as desired. * If iGLCT+∆+α C → D, then by Lemma 3.37 there exists some X-saturated β ⊇ α∪∆∪{C} w.r.t iGLCT (and a fortiori iGLCT) such that D ∈ β. Induction hypothesis implies β C and β D. One may observe that α ≺ β or α = β, and hence α C → D, as desired.
-There is no γ ❁ α: since iGLCT + α C → D, by Lemma 3.37, there exists some X-saturate set β ⊇ α ∪ {C} with respect to iGLCT such that D ∈ β. Hence by induction hypothesis β C and β D. One may observe that β α and hence α C → D.
Next we use the construction method [Iem01] to fulfil the other conditions: being neat and tree. Let K t := (K t , t , ❁ t , V t ) as follows:
• K t is the set of all finite sequences r := α 0 , . . . α n such that for any i < n either we have α i ≺ α i+1 or α i ❁ α i+1 . Let f (r) indicates the final element of the sequence r.
• r t s iff r is an initial segment of s and f (r) f (s).
• r ❁ t s iff r is an initial segment of s = α 0 , . . . α n , e.g. r = α 0 , . . . α k for some k < n and α i ❁ α i+1 for some k ≤ i < n.
It is straightforward to show that K t is semi-perfect Suc-quasi-classical Kripke model and for every r ∈ K t and formula B we have Proof. The proof is very similar to the one for Theorem 8.5, except for the argument for X E and X F andĒ andF and the boolean interpretation I, which are unnecessary here with the presence of the CP a . For readability reasons, we bring the adapted proof here.
The soundness is straightforward and left to the reader. For the completeness, let iGLCTPC a A. Let A ′ be a boolean equivalent of A which is a conjunction of implications E → F in which E is a conjunction of a set of atomics or boxed propositions and F is a disjunction of atomics or boxed proposition. Evidently such A ′ exists for every A. Hence iGLCTPC a A ′ . Then there must be some conjunct E → F of A ′ such that iGLCTP E → F , E is a conjunction of atomic and boxed propositions and F is a disjunction of atomic and boxed propositions. Proof. Both directions are proved contra-positively. For the soundness part, assume that K, α, I |= A ✷↓ for some boolean interpretation I and quasi-classical perfect Kripke model K :
Since derivability is finite, it is enough to show that for every finite set Γ of modal propositions we have
By Theorem 8.5 and Lemma 3.43, it is enough to find some number i such that
Let us define n i and m i as the number of propositions in the sets N i := {B ∈ Γ : K (i) , α i , I |= B ✷ ∧ ✷B ✷ } and M i := {B ∈ Γ : K (i) , α i , I |= ✷B ✷ ∧ ¬B ✷ }, respectively. We use induction on k and prove the following statement: ϕ(k) := for every i, if n i < k then there is some 0 ≤ j ≤ 1 + n i such that
Then by ϕ(n 0 + 1), one may find some number j such that K j , α j , I |= B∈Γ (✷B ✷ → B ✷ ), and by Lemma 3.43 we also have K j , α j , I |= A ✷↓ , as desired. ϕ(0) trivially holds. As induction hypothesis, let ϕ(k) holds and show that ϕ(k + 1) holds as follows. Let some number i such that n i < k + 1. If n i < k, by induction hypothesis we have the desired conclusion. So let n i = k. If m i = 0, we may let j = 0 and we have eq. (8.1). So let B ∈ Γ such that K (i) , α i , I |= ✷B ✷ ∧ ¬B ✷ . We have two sub-cases:
• m i+1 = 0: observe in this case that eq. (8.1) holds for j = 1.
. Hence if we let j := j ′ + 1 we have 0 ≤ j ≤ 1 + n i and eq. (8.1), as desired.
For the completeness part, assume that iGLCTS * P A ✷↓ . Hence . For a Kripke model K = (K, , ❁, V ), letK, indicates the Kripke model derived from K by making every ❁-accessible node as a classical node. More precisely, we defineK := (K,˜ , ❁, V )) in this way: α˜ β iff "α is not ❁-accessible (α ∈ Suc) and α β" or "α is ❁-accessible (α ∈ Suc) and α = β" Lemma 8.12. For every Suc-quasi-classical semi-perfect Kripke model K = (K, , ❁, V ) and α ∈ Suc and arbitrary proposition A we have K, α A ✷↓ ⇐⇒K, α A ✷↓ .
Proof. First observe that for every α ∈ Suc and every proposition B we havẽ Proof. We use induction on the proof iGLCTPC a ⊢ A and show GLC a ⊢ A ✷↓ . All cases are similar to the one for iGLCTP, except for • A = p → ✷p: then iK4 ⊢ A ✷↓ ↔ A and hence GLC a ⊢ A ✷↓ .
For the other way around, let iGLCTPC a A. Then by ✷CP we have A ✷↓ ↔ A, and then we may deduce iGLCTPC a A ✷↓ . By Theorem 8.6, there exists some quasi-classical perfect Kripke model K such that K, α |= A ✷↓ . Corollary 3.41 implies K, α |= c A ✷↓ , which by soundness of GLC a for classical Kripke models with the property of truth-ascending (i.e. if p is true at some node, then it is true also at all accessible nodes), implies GLC a A ✷↓ . ✷ Theorem 8.14. iGLCTPC a = PL Σ 1 (PA * , PA) ≤ PL Σ 1 (PA, PA) = GLC a .
Proof. The arithmetical soundness of iGLCTPC a is straightforward and left to the reader. Also GLC a = PL Σ 1 (PA, PA) holds by Theorem 7.1. It is enough here to show that AC Σ 1 (iGLCTC a ; PA * , PA) ≤ f,f AC Σ 1 (GLC a ; PA, PA). Proof. We use induction on the proof iGLCTC a ⊢ A and show iGLPC a ⊢ A ✷↓ . All cases are identical to the corresponding on in the previous proof, except for when A = p → ✷p, which trivially we have iGLPC a ⊢ A ✷↓ . For the other way around, let iGLCTC a A. Then by Lemma 3.6 we have A ✷↓ ↔ A, and hence iGLCTC a A ✷↓ . By Theorem 8.4, there exists some Suc-quasi-classical semi-perfect atomcomplete Kripke model K such that K, α A ✷↓ , for some node α. We may assume α ∈ Suc, otherwise eliminate all nodes not in (α ) ∪ (α ❁) and consider this new Kripke model instead of K. Obviously the new Kripke model still refutes A ✷↓ at α and is Suc-quasi-classical semi-perfect and atom-complete. Hence Lemma 8.12 implies thatK, α A ✷↓ , in whichK indicates the Kripke model derived from K by making every ❁-accessible node as a classical node. Precise definition ofK came before Lemma 8.12. It is obvious thatK is a Suc-classical semi-perfect atom-complete Kripke model. Hence Theorem 7.13 implies iGLPC a A ✷↓ , as desired. ✷ Theorem 8.16. iGLCTC a = PL Σ 1 (PA * , HA) ≤ PL Σ 1 (PA, HA) = iGLPC a .
Proof. The arithmetical soundness of iGLCTC a is straightforward and left to the reader. Also iGLPC a = PL Σ 1 (PA, HA) holds by Theorem 7.14. It is enough here to show that AC Σ 1 (iGLCTC a ; PA * , HA) ≤ f,f AC Σ 1 (iGLPC a ; PA, HA). Proof. We use induction on the proof iGLCTS * PC a ⊢ A and show GLSC a ⊢ A ✷↓ . All cases are similar to the one for iGLCTS * P, except for
• iGL ⊢ A: by Lemma 3.7 we have iGL ⊢ A ✷↓ .
• A = B ∨ ¬B: Then A ✷↓ = B ✷↓ ∨ ¬B ✷↓ which is valid in GL.
• iGLCTP ⊢ B and iGLCTP ⊢ B → A with lower proof length than the one for A: by induction hypothesis we have GL ⊢ B ✷↓ and GL ⊢ B ✷↓ → A ✷↓ , which implies GL ⊢ A ✷↓ , as desired.
For the other way around, let iGLCTP A. Then by ✷CP we have A ✷↓ ↔ A, and then we may deduce iGLCTP A ✷↓ . By Theorem 8.5, there exists some quasi-classical perfect Kripke model K and some boolean interpretation I such that K, α, I |= A ✷↓ . Corollary 3.41 implies K, α, I |= c A ✷↓ , which by soundness of GL for classical Kripke models, implies GL A ✷↓ . ✷ Theorem 8.27. iGLCTP = PL(PA * , PA) ≤ PL Σ 1 (PA * , PA) = iGLCTPC a .
Proof. The arithmetical soundness of iGLCTP is straightforward and left to the reader. By Theorem 8.14 we have PL Σ 1 (PA * , PA) = iGLCTPC a . We must show AC(iGLCTP; PA * , PA) ≤ f,f AC Σ 1 (iGLCTPC a ; PA * , PA). • iH * as defined in [AM19] ,
• iHP is iH plus P,
• iHSP is iH plus S and P, Appendices Name(s) Axiom Scheme Name(s) Axiom Scheme
For an axiom scheme A, let A indicates ✷ A and A indicates A ∧ A 
